Labour Market Impacts of AI/AGI

Colin Rowat

AI Safety Tōkyō

June 24, 2026

Introduction?

  1. goals:
    1. sense of results
    2. sense of methodology
  2. LLM companies are hiring (labour) economists
    • why?
    • what sort of roles?
  3. what are we learning?
    • what we would expect
    • basic patterns seem closely replicable with much simpler measures (e.g. white collar/blue collar, median income by US state)
    • not a criticism: a huge amount of ‘ground clearing’ work is being done; will enable later progress

Anthropic Economic Index

US usage

global usage

Anthropic’s economic research

  1. Agentic coding and persistent returns to expertise, 16/06/2026
  2. Coding agents in the social sciences, 27/05/2026
  3. Announcing the Anthropic Economic Index Survey, 22/04/2026
  4. What 81,000 people told us about the economics of AI, 22/04/2026
  5. How Australia Uses Claude: Findings from the Anthropic Economic Index, 31/03/2026
  6. Anthropic Economic Index report: Learning curves, 24/03/2026
  7. Labor market impacts of AI: a new measure and early evidence, 05/03/2026
  8. India Country Brief: The Anthropic Economic Index, 16/02/2026
  9. Anthropic Economic Index: New building blocks for understanding AI use, 15/01/2026
  10. Anthropic Economic Index report: Economic primitives, 15/01/2026
  11. Estimating AI productivity gains from Claude conversations, 25/11/2025
  12. Anthropic Economic Index report: Uneven geographic and enterprise AI adoption, 15/09/2025
  13. Anthropic Economic Index: Tracking AI’s role in the US and global economy, 15/09/2025
  14. Anthropic Economic Index: AI’s impact on software development, 28/04/2025
  15. Anthropic Economic Index: Insights from Claude 3.7 Sonnet, 27/03/2025
  16. The Anthropic Economic Index, 10/02/2025

Massenkoff & McCrory (2026)

A new measure: observed exposure

  • “We introduce a new measure of AI displacement risk, observed exposure, that combines theoretical LLM capability and real-world usage data, weighting automated (rather than augmentative) and work-related uses more heavily”

“A job’s exposure is higher if:

  1. Its tasks are theoretically possible with AI
  2. Its tasks see significant usage in the Anthropic Economic Index
  3. Its tasks are performed in work-related contexts
  4. It has a relatively higher share of automated use patterns or API implementation
  5. Its AI-impacted tasks make up a larger share of the overall role”

O*NET database: jobs are made of tasks

Task-level work usage

\[\underbrace{WorkUsage_t}_{\text{weighted work-related count for task } t} = \underbrace{ClaudeWorkUsage_t}_{\text{observed work-related usage in Claude.ai }} + \underbrace{APIUsage_t}_{\text{observed usage in 1P API}}\]

  • \(ClaudeWorkUsage_t\) removes educational, personal use cases, “to better capture the scope for labor market impacts”
  • 1P (first party) API not filtered: “API calls typically signal integration into production workflows”
  • gate: \(WorkUsage_t\) must be greater than 100 or 0.0025% of traffic, else 0
    • Claude usage data ‘privacy protected’: only drawn from bins large enough to anonymise

Task-level exposure (Eloundou et al., 2023, 2024)

\[\tilde{r}_t \equiv \mathbb{1} \left\{ WorkUsage_t \ge 100 \right\} \times \mathbb{1} \left\{ \beta_1 \ge 0.5 \right\} \times \alpha_t\]

  • “\(\beta\) scores tasks on a simple scale: \(1\) if a task can be doubled in speed by an LLM alone, \(0.5\) if it requires additional tools or software built on top of the LLM, and \(0\) otherwise.”
  • “\(\beta_t\) is … set to 1 if \(\beta\) is above zero … because many LLMs today will have [web search and image recognition] capabilities”

\[\alpha_t \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 + \frac{ClaudeWorkUsage_t \times AutoShare_t + APIUsage_t}{ClaudeWorkUsage_t + APIUsage_t} \right)\]

Task-level automation v augmentation (Appel et al., 2026; 2025)

Automation: focused on task completion

  • Directive: LLM completes a task with minimal back-and-forth
  • Feedback Loops: automate tasks and provide feedback to LLM as needed

Augmentation: collaborative interaction

  • Learning: ask LLM for info, explanations
  • Task Iteration: iterate on tasks collaboratively with LLM
  • Validation: ask LLM for feedback on their work

Job-level exposure

\[R_o \equiv \frac{\sum_{t \in T_o} w_t \cdot \tilde{r}_t}{\sum_{t \in T_o} w_t}\] where \(T_o\) is the set of tasks for job \(o\) and \(w_t\) the fraction of time spent on task \(t\)

Key finding: AI coverage is a fraction of what’s feasible

  1. “AI is far from reaching its theoretical capability”
  • blue area: theoretical coverage derived from Eloundou et al. (2023)
  • red area: “how people are using Claude in professional settings”

Key finding: slower growth for more exposed professions

  1. “Occupations with higher observed exposure are projected by the BLS to grow less through 2034”
  • “a binned scatterplot with 25 equally-sized bins. Each solid dot shows the average observed exposure and projected employment change for one of the bins. The dashed line shows a simple linear regression fit, weighted by current employment levels.”

Key finding: exposed are older, female, more educated, higher-paid

  1. “Workers in the most exposed professions are more likely to be older, female, more educated, and higher-paid”
  • “The more exposed group is 16 percentage points more likely to be female, 11 percentage points more likely to be white, and almost twice as likely to be Asian. They earn 47% more, on average, and have higher levels of education. For example, people with graduate degrees are 4.5% of the unexposed group, but 17.4% of the most exposed group, an almost fourfold difference.”

BLS employment projections

  • BLS employment projections available here

  • BLS overview available here

    • occupational classification: “based on the structure used by the OEWS program, which is using a classification system based on the 2018 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system.”
      • “To match O*NET-SOC codes to occ1990 codes in the CPS, we use the crosswalk provided by Eckhardt & Goldschlag (2025).”
    • projections methodology: “six interrelated steps, each of which is based on a different procedure or model and assumptions: labor force, aggregate economy, final demand (GDP) by consuming sector and product, industry output, industry employment, and occupational employment. The results produced by each step are key inputs to following steps, and the sequence may be repeated multiple times to allow feedback and to ensure consistency.”

Key finding: evidence that younger workers are more at risk

  1. “We find no systematic increase in unemployment for highly exposed workers since late 2022, though we find suggestive evidence that hiring of younger workers has slowed in exposed occupations”

CES production functions: single substitutability parameter, \(\sigma\)

Appel et al. (2026)

  • general CES production function: \(y = A \left[ \sum_{i=1}^n a_i X_i^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}}\)
  • \(\sigma < 1 \Leftrightarrow\) complements: tasks that AI can’t speed up become bottlenecks

So what, big deal?

  1. is AI exposure = white-collar?
  2. exploiting O*NET’s graph structure?
  3. correcting Claude’s time estimates

White-collar vs blue-collar as a proxy for AI exposure (ACS 2022)

  • White-collar: Management, Business, Science, & Arts; Healthcare Practitioners & Technical; Sales & Office
  • Blue-collar: Service; Natural Resources, Construction, & Maintenance; Production, Transportation, & Material Moving

White-collar

Blue-collar

difference
Anthropic
most v not exposed
female 54.0% 26.4% +27.6% +16%
white 63.9% 49.6% +14.3% +11%
Black 10.1% 13.7% −3.6% -3.5%
Asian 8.2% 4.5% +3.7% +4.4%
Hispanic 13.1% 27.7% −14.6% -11.0%
graduate degree 25.4% 2.3% +23.1% +12.8%
bachelor’s or higher 59.7% 11.9% +47.8% +36.7%
Median earnings $72,693 $45,089 +61.2% +47%
  1. Anthropic earning difference may be mean, rather than median
  2. Pearson coefficient of determination, \(r^2 = 0.984\)

Correcting Claude’s time estimates (Tamkin & McCrory, 2025)

“We use Claude to estimate how long it would take people to do real-world tasks with and without AI assistance”

“Claude’s estimates are much more compressed than humans - predicting comparatively long times for shorter tasks, and vice versa - and are overall more prone to overestimates”

A materialising Nobel nation

suppose a literal “country of geniuses” were to materialize somewhere in the world in ~2027. Imagine, say, 50 million people, all of whom are much more capable than any Nobel Prize winner, statesman, or technologist. (Amodei, 2026)

What about a materialising nation of Maths Olympiad winners?

We use unique international data on the publications, citations, and affiliations of mathematicians to examine the impact of a large, post-1992 influx of Soviet mathematicians on the productivity of their U.S. counterparts. We find a negative productivity effect on those mathematicians whose research overlapped with that of the Soviets. We also document an increased mobility rate (to lower quality institutions and out of active publishing) and a reduced likelihood of producing “home run” papers. Although the total product of the preexisting American mathematicians shrank, the Soviet contribution to American mathematics filled in the gap. (Borjas & Doran, 2012)

Althoff & Reichardt (2026)

Three channels: augmentation, automation and simplification

The output of task \(\tau\) that contributes to occupation \(j\) is \[ y_{\tau} \left( \mathbf{h}, l_{\tau}, k_{\tau} \right) = \begin{cases} l_{\tau} \textcolor[RGB]{154,37,21}{\gamma_{\tau}} f \left( \mathbf{h}, \textcolor[RGB]{154,37,21}{\mathbf{r}_{\tau}} \right) & \text{if } \tau \not \in \mathcal{A}_j \\ l_{\tau} \textcolor[RGB]{154,37,21}{\gamma_{\tau}} f \left( \mathbf{h}, \textcolor[RGB]{154,37,21}{\mathbf{r}_{\tau}} \right) + \phi_{\tau} k_{\tau} & \text{if } \tau \in \textcolor[RGB]{154,37,21}{\mathcal{A}_j} \end{cases} \] \(\mathcal{A}_j\) is the set of automatable tasks; \(l_{\tau}\) the share of the worker’s time devoted to that task; \(\gamma_{\tau}\) the productivity of human capital (or skills), \(\mathbf{h}\); \(\phi_{\tau}\) the productivity of AI; \(\mathbf{r}_{\tau}\) the task’s skill requirement; and \(k_{\tau}\) the amount of capital devoted to the task.

  • augmentation: increasing \(\gamma_{\tau}\)
  • automation: expanding \(\mathcal{A}_j\)
  • simplification: reducing \(\mathbf{r}_{\tau}\)

This literature tends to reduce all three to binary variables.

AI simplifies jobs: low skill workers compete for high skill jobs

  • “occupations predicted to be more simplified by AI exhibit a decline in required expertise in real-time job postings” based on “relative frequency of words”
  • every period, workers pick O*NET jobs
  • AI support can increase productivity, but may reduce learning
  • firms fix workers’ time allocations across tasks
  • GE: return to capital, wages determined in equilibrium
  • Assumption 2: “automatable tasks are cheaper to perform with capital than with labor”
  • calibrated to NLSY79, with some LLM ‘elicitation’

AI simplification compresses the wage distribution

If AI is more expensive for lower skill workers to adopt

LLM & supercomputer approaches

Measuring skills exposure in the AI economy (Chopra et al., 2025)

Modeling 8.4mn agents over 90 steps for US$500 (Chopra, 2025)

  • inputs
    1. 150,000 attributes \(\times\) 151 mn US workers
    2. 13,000+ AI workforce
    3. 2.5 bn human-AI interactions
  • outputs
    1. Surface Index: tech sector exposure
    2. Iceberg Index: white-collar exposure
  • validation
    1. skill-based: O*NET embeddings predict actual career transitions with 85% recall
    2. adoption: compare Surface Index exposure to Anthropic Economic Index usage

Replicating the Iceberg Index’ adoption validation

By US state (inc. DC)

AEI usage
leading emerging aspiring
II exposure leading \(8\) \(9\)
emerging \(18\)
aspiring \(6\) \(9\)
  1. how easily can we replicate the adoption validation in (Chopra et al., 2025)?
  2. what should the alignment of usage and exposure be?
AEI usage (05/11/25)
leading emerging aspiring
Med. HH inc. (2023) leading \(8\) \(4\) \(1\)
emerging \(4\) \(17\) \(4\)
aspiring \(1\) \(4\) \(8\)

Spearman rank coefficient: \(\rho = 0.760\)

By country

Spearman rank coefficient (AEI usage, 26/06/26; IMF GDP/working age, 2024): \(\rho = 0.931\)

Labour market impacts of AGI?

David Ricardo’s comparative advantage

Hours needed to produce one unit
cloth wine total
England 100 120 220
Portugal 90 80 170

Does AI end comparative advantage? (Cunningham, 2025)

  1. Every service or good can be produced by a robot: 1hr robot labor = 1hr human labor.

  2. A human requires 100 sq ft to live, but a robot requires 1 sq ft. Land is the only fixed resource: you can imagine this as also representing energy and scarce minerals.

  3. Robots are sufficiently plentiful that they are rented at their resource cost, i.e. 1 sq ft of land.

  4. Half of all humans own land while the other half do not: their only asset is their labor.

  5. There is no intrinsic demand for human labor: people care about the quality, not who made it.

For people who own property you now have as many workers as square feet of land. …

If you do not own land, and pay rent every month. To provide a service cheaper than your landlord’s robot your wage needs to be equivalent to 1 square foot of land, i.e. less than subsistence.

Modelling transformative/AGI’s impact

  1. climate modules: computational, human efficiency (e.g. Barrage & Nordhaus, 2024)
  2. game theory: modeling e.g. China/US ‘winner take all’ AGI arms race
  3. income distribution: (Cunningham, 2025)’s subsistence costs & labour market impacts
  4. population dynamics, inc. extinction
  5. symbiogenesis: as the way eukaryotic life arose, a next evolutionary step?
  6. governance strength: can policies like UBI or UHI be implemented?
  7. vintage capital: is the intelligence in old GPUs retired with the GPUs, degraded to render farms…?
  8. coalitional game theory: do AGIs join nations or form new ones? Can humans join the latter?
  9. property rights/power contests: apart from subsistence costs, the powerful simply dispossess

References

Althoff, L., & Reichardt, H. (2026). Task-specific technical change and comparative advantage. NBER Working Paper, (w35353).
Amodei, D. (2026, January 26). The adolescence of technology. https://www.darioamodei.com/essay/the-adolescence-of-technology
Appel, R., Massenkoff, M., McCrory, P., McCain, M., Heller, R., Neylon, T., & Tamkin, A. (2026, January 15). Anthropic economic index report: Economic primitives. https://www.anthropic.com/research/anthropic-economic-index-january-2026-report
Appel, R., McCrory, P., Tamkin, A., Stern, M., McCain, M., & Neylon, T. (2025, September 15). Anthropic economic index report: Uneven geographic and enterprise AI adoption. www.anthropic.com/research/anthropic-economic-index-september-2025-report
Barrage, L., & Nordhaus, W. D. (2024). Policies, projections, and the social cost of carbon: Results from the DICE-2023 model. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121(13).
Borjas, G. J., & Doran, K. B. (2012). The collapse of the soviet union and the productivity of american mathematicians. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3), 1143–1203.
Chopra, A. (2025). Large population models. arXiv Preprint arXiv:2507.09901.
Chopra, A., Bhattacharya, S., Salvador, D., Paul, A., Wright, T., Garg, A., Ahmad, F., Schwarze, A. C., Raskar, R., & Balaprakash, P. (2025). The iceberg index: Measuring skills-centered exposure in the AI economy. arXiv Preprint arXiv:2510.25137.
Cunningham, T. (2025, September 19). Economics and transformative AI. https://tecunningham.github.io/posts/2025-09-19-transformative-AI-notes.html
Eckhardt, S., & Goldschlag, N. (2025, August 10). AI and jobs: The final word (until the next one). Economic Innovation Group. https://eig.org/ai-and-jobs-the-final-word/
Eloundou, T., Manning, S., Mishkin, P., & Rock, D. (2023). GPTs are GPTs: An early look at the labor market impact potential of large language models. https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.10130
Eloundou, T., Manning, S., Mishkin, P., & Rock, D. (2024). GPTs are GPTs: Labor market impact potential of LLMs. Science, 384(6702), 1306–1308. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adj0998
Karger, E., Kuusela, O., Abaluck, J., Bryan, K. A., Halperin, B., Jones, T. R., Murphy, C., Trammell, P., Reynolds, M., Mayland, D., et al. (2026). Forecasting the economic effects of AI. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ludwig, J., Mullainathan, S., & Rambachan, A. (2025). Large language models: An applied econometric framework. NBER Working Paper, (w33344).
Massenkoff, M., & McCrory, P. (2026, March 5). Labor market impacts of AI: A new measure and early evidence. https://www.anthropic.com/research/labor-market-impacts
Tamkin, A., & McCrory, P. (2025, November 5). Estimating AI productivity gains from claude conversations. https://www.anthropic.com/research/estimating-productivity-gains
Zhang, B., Li, J., Hortaçsu, A., Ye, X., Chernozhukov, V., Ni, A., & Huang, E. W. (2025). Agentic economic modeling. arXiv Preprint arXiv:2510.25743.